Strategic interaction between fiscal and monetary policies in an export-oriented economy by Merzlyakov Sergey
 
 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2012, 2, Special Issue, pp. 201-216 
Received: 29 July 2011; Accepted: 11 April 2012. 
 
UDC 336.748:338.23]:339.743
DOI: 10.2298/PAN1202201M
Original scientific paper
 
 
Sergey Merzlyakov 
 
Laboratory for Macroeconomic  
Analysis,  
National Research University Higher 
School of Economics,  
Moscow,  
Russia 
 
 sergei.merzlyakov@gmail.com  
 smerzlyakov@hse.ru 
 
 
 
The study was implemented in the 
framework of the Programme of 
Fundamental Studies of the Higher 
School of Economics in 2011. I am very 
grateful to Sergey Pekarski for many 
useful comments and guidance. I also 
thank two anonymous referees, 
participants at (i) the 15th International 
Conference on Macroeconomic 
Analysis and International Finance, 
Rethymnon, Greece; (ii) the 16th World 
Congress of the International Economic 
Association, Beijing, China; (iii) 
Rethinking Economic Policies in a 
Landscape of Heterogeneous Agents 
(REPLHA) International POLHIA 
Conference, Milan, Italy; and all 
research seminar participants of 
Laboratory for Macroeconomic Analysis 
for their helpful comments and discus-
sions. 
Strategic Interaction Between 
Fiscal and Monetary Policies 
in an Export-Oriented Economy 
 
Summary: Solving the problem of stabilizing the economy is directly tied to the
necessity of keeping the main macroeconomic variables stable. However,
macroeconomic stability is not in the general case a purely fiscal or a purely 
monetary problem. How the central bank and the government interact is of
principle importance. We investigate the impact of macroeconomic policies on
the dynamics of the exchange rate, inflation, output and stabilization fund and
consider different forms of strategic interaction between the government and
the central bank. In this paper we build a stylized model of an export-oriented 
economy. We use numerical examples for our analysis and practical conclu-
sions. The effective interaction of fiscal and monetary policies is possible under 
a cooperative Stackelberg game interaction with the government as leader. It is
shown that the independence of the central bank does not play a crucial role. 
Key words: Fiscal policy, Monetary policy, Exchange rate.
JEL: E41, E52, E61, E63.
 
 
 
The interaction of fiscal and monetary policies has become especially relevant during 
the last 30 years. The paper “Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic” by Thomas J. 
Sargent and Neil Wallace (1981) was groundbreaking; the authors showed that re-
stricted monetary policy, given realistic assumptions, is not able to decrease inflation 
either in the long or short run without certain changes in fiscal policy. 
Two lines of research have appeared in the economic literature. The first of 
these (Allan Drazen 1985; Michael Bruno and Stanley Fisher 1990) studied the effect 
of interaction of common fiscal and monetary policies on public debt without using a 
formal game-theoretic approach. A second approach, formed by Alan  S. 
Blinder  (1982), Guido Tabellini (1986), Alberto Alesina and Tabellini  (1987) is 
based on the formal description of an optimal strategic interaction of the two policies. 
Blinder (1982) studied various means by which fiscal and monetary policies may 
interact, casting doubt on the assumption that their coordination can always be effec-
tive. Roel M. W. J. Beetsma and Lans Bovenberg (1995, 1999) also considered the 
conflict of interest between fiscal and monetary policies, namely the regulation of 
public debt and of the rate of inflation. They show that it is possible to achieve effec-
tive interaction of the two authorities irrespective of whether the central bank is in-
dependent or not.  
Another area of research concerns the strategic complementarity problem: 
both fiscal and monetary policies can use instruments to influence aggregate demand 
and in doing so find a compromise between output and inflation. Torben M. Ander-
sen and Friedrich Schneider (1986) were some of the first to consider this problem,  
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noting that two independent authorities do not automatically guarantee optimal out-
put. Avinash Dixit and Luisa Lambertini (2003) showed that coordination entails a 
smaller output and higher inflation than either authority would like, if monetary poli-
cies are more conservative than fiscal policies. They also pointed out that in this case 
it would be preferable for the fiscal authorities to lead. 
The creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) influenced researchers 
to consider the interaction of fiscal and monetary authorities in more detail and to 
provide suggestions for solving real-life problems. See for example, Beetsma and 
Bovenberg (2000), Jordi Galí et al. (2003), Beetsma and Bovenberg (2005), Tatiana 
Kirsanova et al. (2007), Severine Menguy (2011). Beetsma and Bovenberg (2000) 
generally approved of the EMU policies and determined that the Maastricht Treaty, 
which gave priority to the European Central Bank (ECB) in stabilizing prices, was 
reasonable but insufficient. Dixit and Lambertini (2003) noted that the efficient func-
tioning of the EMU is needed not so much for the coordination of fiscal and mone-
tary authorities or for the integration of fiscal authorities in different countries, but 
rather for the consistency of goals with respect to the optimal levels of output and 
inflation. Silvia Staudinger (2003) suggested a rather different solution to the prob-
lem of interaction between fiscal and monetary authorities in the EMU. In her opin-
ion, the most efficient interaction of the two authorities is determined by the weight 
that these two agents assign to output, inflation and other indices in their loss func-
tions. She comes to the conclusion that under current conditions the EMU should 
prefer an independent, dominant ECB.  
Bodo Herzog (2006) considers the problem of coordinating fiscal and mone-
tary policies in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). He shows that coun-
tries with more bargaining power (such as Russia) tend to coordinate less and more 
slowly. This is because of various factors, such as the risk premium in the interest 
rate, the free-rider problem and asymmetry of information. 
This paper complements a number of papers on the subject of the interaction 
between fiscal and monetary policies. Our research is focused on the game-
theoretical approach of strategic interaction between the government and the central 
bank. However, due to the specifics of an export-oriented economy, this paper’s ap-
proach significantly differs from the approaches proposed by Tabellini (1986), 
Beetsma and Bovenberg (1995, 1999) and Dixit and Lambertini (2003). We explore 
fiscal and monetary policy interaction in an export-oriented (resource-based) econ-
omy. The problem of fiscal and monetary policy interaction in an export-oriented 
country with undeveloped financial markets requires considering specific macroeco-
nomic relationships. We consider specific channels of fiscal and monetary policy 
interaction in an open economy with exchange rate management, which influences 
the fiscal position. Our basic model starts with aggregate relationships and as a proto-
type we consider the development of Russian economy in the period between 2001 
and the mid of 2008. The managed exchange rate regime, when the exchange rate is 
determined by foreign exchange market operations conducted by the central bank, is 
assumed. If the central bank chooses to keep the exchange rate at a high level in or-
der to stimulate national exports, it must buy foreign currency. However, the accu-
mulation of international reserves is accompanied by an increase in the monetary  
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base that in turn stimulates inflation. The inflationary consequences of an expansion-
ary monetary policy can be in part sterilized by contractionary fiscal policy. By ac-
cumulating a stabilization fund, the government removes money from circulation and 
brings inflationary pressure down. Thus, by determining the discretionary budget 
surplus and the nominal exchange rate, fiscal and monetary policies can affect the 
macroeconomic equilibrium. The choice of these control variables depends on the 
specific form of strategic interaction between the government and the central bank. 
While the model indeed captures main features of the Russian economy, the most 
important mechanisms of the model could be applied to other countries with unde-
veloped financial markets, that follow managed exchange-rate policies and whose 
budget revenues highly depend on their undifferentiated exports. Moreover, we in-
vestigate interrelated problems of exchange rate management, disinflation policy, the 
accumulation of a stabilization fund and effects on the real economy. Monetary au-
thorities face a specific trade-off between inflation reduction and exchange-rate man-
agement aimed to stimulate national exports. Indeed, as long as the exchange rate is 
one of the key determinants of export revenues - in turn the significant part of the tax 
base - by managing the exchange rate, monetary policy alters the set of fiscal policy 
alternatives. At the same time, fiscal surpluses and the accumulation of a stabilization 
fund by the government pump money out of circulation which reduces inflation. It 
means that fiscal policy also alters the set of monetary policy alternatives. It should 
be mentioned, that sterilization of excess money is important but is not the only goal 
of accumulating stabilization funds. We do not discuss all these goals as they are not 
in the focus of the paper. 
These considerations form the basis for investigation of the mechanism and 
demand the search for the best form of strategic interaction between fiscal and mone-
tary authorities. 
 
1. Model 
 
1.1 Building the Model 
 
We consider a static model for the interaction between fiscal and monetary policies. 
The values of all the variables in period 0 are given. The values of the variables in 
period 1 are determined exogenously or endogenously. In this setup the model is es-
sentially static, although it can be used in a multi-period analysis. The fiscal authority 
chooses the discretionary budget surplus, defined as government expenditure minus 
net lump-sum taxes. The choice of the term discretionary budget surplus has to do 
with the fact that it is this variable (and not the overall budget surplus) that is chosen 
by the government in its strategic interaction with the central bank. Other taxes are 
determined endogenously: income tax revenues depend on output, while taxes on 
export revenues depend on the flow of export and the exchange rate. We assume a 
managed exchange rate regime, when the exchange rate is determined by foreign 
exchange market operations conducted by the central bank. If the central bank 
chooses to keep the exchange rate at a high level in order to stimulate national ex-
ports, it must buy foreign currency. However, the accumulation of international re-
serves is accompanied by an increase in the base money that in turn stimulates infla- 
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tion. The inflationary consequences of an expansionary monetary policy can be in 
part sterilized by contractionary fiscal policy. By accumulating a stabilization fund, 
the government removes money from circulation and brings inflationary pressure 
down. Thus, by determining the discretionary budget surplus and the nominal ex-
change rate, fiscal and monetary policies can affect the macroeconomic equilibrium. 
The choice of these control variables depends on the specific form of strategic inter-
action between the government and the central bank. 
The model is based on the following seven equations: 
 
 1 1 1 Y P x V M E    Aggregate demand  (1)
   0 1
*
1 0 1 ε ε β Y Y α π π      Open-economy Phillips curve  (2)
  0 0 0 0 0 1 P x tY Ex E ψ s s     Government budget constraint  (3)
0 1 0 0 0 Im z z CF Ex     The balance of payments  (4)
 1 0 1 0 1 E z z M M    Foreign exchange operations  (5)
0 1 0 1 0 1 E E M M s s M M      Money decomposition  (6)
1 1 1 ε P E 
 
Real exchange rate  (7)
 
The first equation describes aggregate demand in the tradition of the quantity 
theory of money. Money in circulation,  1 E M , adjusted for the velocity,    x V , equals 
nominal GDP,  1 1Y P . In what follows, the subscripts 0 and 1 refer to periods 0 and 1, 
respectively. We assume that only money in circulation, and not the whole amount of 
money,  1 M , affects aggregate demand and prices. This is because money accumu-
lated in the government’s stabilization fund  1 s  and thus removed from circulation 
does not affect either real production  1 Y  or the price level  1 P . Equation (6) deter-
mines the decomposition of the total amount of money injected into the economy by 
the central bank’s operations on the foreign exchange market and will be discussed 
later. 
We assume that money velocity declines with an increase in the discretionary 
budget surplus,  kx V V   1 : an expansionary fiscal policy increases money velocity 
and a contractionary policy slows it down. We should note that transmission mecha-
nisms in emerging market economies (such as Russia) function poorly and the inter-
est rate cannot be considered a regulator of economic activity. This supports the as-
sumption of a direct dependence of money velocity on the fiscal policy variable. We 
should take into account that there are a number of mechanisms (such as taxes and 
transfers) that reflect the impact of the government on aggregate demand along with 
the money accumulation to the stabilization fund. In terms of the quantity theory of 
money, these mechanisms should be reflected in changes in the velocity of money. 
The velocity of money is a kind of “residual” in the equation that relates aggregate  
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output, price level and money in circulation. In other words, this assumption is a 
convenient way of modeling the inevitable direct effects of fiscal policy on aggregate 
demand. Thus, the model contains two channels through which fiscal policy can im-
pact aggregate demand: by regulating the money in circulation and by varying the 
velocity of money. The value of V  is assumed to be exogenous and constant. The 
relationship of the velocity of money and fiscal policy is crucial and nontrivial for 
our analysis of the interaction between fiscal and monetary policies. 
As a practical matter, we consider a linear specification of a dynamic model so 
that an analytical solution can be found. In particular, it will be convenient to write 
the exchange equation in terms of increments: 
0
0 1
1
0
0
0
0 1
Y
Y Y
π
V
V kx V
M
M M
E
E E 
 
 


, where 
0
0 1
1 P
P P
π

  is the inflation rate in 
the first period.  
Equation (2) gives aggregate supply. The relationship between inflation and 
output is traditionally expressed by the Phillips curve. However, in our model the 
Phillips curve is written in a slightly modified way,     0 1
*
1 0 1 ε ε β Y Y α π π      , 
where 
* Y  is the natural rate of output,   is the real exchange rate of the foreign cur-
rency, and   and   are positive parameters. This modified equation is the simplest 
Phillips curve for an open economy (for more detail, see Assaf Razin and Chi Wa 
Yuen 2002). Intuitively, this form of the modified Phillips curve can be explained in 
the following manner. A real depreciation of the national currency brings about an 
increase in exports and in increase in output (as a result of an increase in aggregate 
demand). An increase in output brings about an increase in the price level both for 
final goods and services, and for resources. In particular, labor costs will increase. In 
its turn, the increase in wages determines a decrease in short-term aggregate demand 
and thus a decrease in output. This effect is known as the “Dutch disease” or “re-
source curse”. Thus, in general there are two effects of an increase in exports and the 
exchange rate of foreign currency: an increase in aggregate demand and a decrease in 
aggregate supply. Since our model does not consider the problem of dynamic incon-
sistency of macroeconomic policy, the specification of the Phillips curve does not 
have rational expectations. It should be noted, that in contrast to Dixit and Lamber-
tini (2003), we use a structural approach for the modeling of macroeconomic rela-
tionships and do not analyze the macroeconomic policy with binding commitment of 
the government or the central bank. For this reason, the paper does not address the 
problem of forming rational expectations of the private sector with regard to macro-
economic policy. 
The government budget constraint is given by equation (3). An increase in the 
stabilization fund (in real terms),   0 0 1 P s s  , is determined by the total budget sur-
plus  x tY Ex E ψ   0 0 0 , where  0 E  is the nominal exchange rate of the foreign cur-
rency. Thus, part of the stabilization fund is formed by the discretionary budget sur-
plus and the income tax. In essence, this part of the stabilization fund is formed by  
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the government, which exogenously sets the tax rate t and forms the discretionary 
budget surplus,  x. Note that the discretionary budget surplus includes only lump-
sum taxes,  G T x   , and differs from the total budget surplus by the taxes that de-
pend on exports and output,   tY ε c Ex δ G T surplus budget  




    
___
. In our 
model, the discretionary budget surplus x  is the main instrument of fiscal policy.  
In addition, the increase in the stabilization fund is determined by the volume 
of exports,  0 0Ex E , which is taxed at a rate of ψ . The volume of exports positively 
depends on the real exchange rate,  ε c Ex Ex  
___
. This mechanism of forming the 
stabilization fund depends significantly on the policy of the central bank. The stabili-
zation fund is measured in nominal terms, while the budget surplus is measured in 
real terms. Thus, the accumulation of the stabilization fund in the first period may be 
written as  0 0 0
___
0 1 P x tY ε c Ex δ s s 





  




    . 
Equation (4) determines the balance of payments (in foreign currency). The 
capital account,  0 CF , is taken to be exogenous. The increase in international re-
serves,    0 1 z z  , is determined as the sum of current account,   0 0 Im  Ex , and the 
capital account. The volume of imports negatively depends on the real exchange rate, 
ε b aY   Im . 
The next equation of system (5) determines the increase in money and the in-
crease in the international reserves of the central bank. In an export-oriented econ-
omy, the main instrument of the central bank is foreign currency operations, in con-
trast to the traditional monetary instruments (open-market operations, the discount 
rate, the reserve ratio). Thus, in our model the main instrument of monetary policy is 
the rate of change of the nominal exchange rate, 
0
0 1
1 E
E E
e

 . By increasing inter-
national reserves, the central bank increases the supply of money; this is shown in 
equation (5). The growth rate of money, 
0
0 1
1 M
M M
μ

 , is determined by exchange-
rate policy,    
0
1 0 0 1
1
1
M
e E z z
μ
 
 . 
However, it is not the entire money that is of principle importance in our 
model; we are concerned mainly with that part which is in circulation. As noted 
above, the rest of the money is sterilized via the stabilization fund. In accordance 
with equation (6), the increase in money as a result of foreign currency operations, 
0 1 M M  , consists of two components: the increase in the stabilization fund,  0 1 s s  , 
and the increase in the money in circulation,  0 1 E E M M  . 
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Equation (7) determines the real exchange rate  . The foreign price level is 
normalized to unity. We can rewrite equation (7) in terms of growth, 
0
0 1
1 1 ε
ε ε
π e

  . 
Thus, we have constructed a system of seven equations with seven endoge-
nous variables: the international reserves  1 z , the growth rate of money  1  , the rate 
of inflation  1  , the money in circulation  1 E M , the real exchange rate  1  , the stabili-
zation fund  1 s  and output  1 Y  in the first period. Our model is completely deter-
mined, and the equilibrium value of each variable can be found. The values of vari-
ables in the zero period are given. The government and the central bank may influ-
ence macroeconomic equilibrium by using their instruments, x  and  1 e . 
 
1.2 Analysis of Equilibrium 
 
We express the equilibrium values of the seven endogenous variables in terms of the 
parameters of the model, the pre-determined variables and the instruments of macro-
economic policy: 
 
Rate of inflation 
 
   
   

   

     0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0
*
1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0
___
0 0 0
___
1 0 0 1 0 1 0
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
0
0
0
0
0
Y α βε M cP δ e E b c Y α V
V kx V M Y α
Y α βε M cP δ e E b c Y α
Y α Y α e βε π M
Y α βε M cP δ e E b c Y α
x tY Ex δ P CF aY Ex e E cP δ e E b c e Y α
π
E
E
E
E
E
τ
     
 


     
  


     
 

 






    




       

 
 
For convenience, the rest of the endogenous variables are written not only in 
terms of endogenous variables, but also in terms of inflation  1  : 
 
International reserves 
   1 1 0 0
___
0 1 π e b c CF aY Ex z z         
 
Base money growth 
    
0
1 0
1 1 0 0
___
1
1
M
e E
π e b c CF aY Ex μ






        
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Money in circulation 
 
      0 0 0 1 1
___
1 0 1 1 0 0
___
1 1 E E M P x tY π e c δ Ex δ e E π e b c CF aY Ex M  




       




        
 
Real exchange rate 
  1 1 0 1 1 π e ε ε     
 
Output 
  * 1 0 0 1 0
1
1
Y
α
e βε π π βε
Y 
  
  
 
Stabilization fund 
 0 0 0 1 1
___
1 s P x tY π e c δ Ex δ s  




       
 
Given how cumbersome the formulas are for the equilibrium values of  1 z ,  1 μ , 
1 π ,  1 E M ,  1 ε ,  1 s  and  1 Y , we will use numerical examples for further analysis and 
practical conclusions. The analysis was conducted using Mathcad 2000 Professional. 
All calculations are available upon request. Using numerical examples is appropriate 
form of analysis not only because of cumbersome formulas, but also because of the 
fact that our model is structural and the equilibrium of the model cannot definitely 
show the sign of the effects of the exogenous variables on the endogenous variables. 
However, determination of the sign of each effect is important for our analysis be-
cause the main goal is to evaluate how all effects influence the macroeconomic equi-
librium together but not separately. 
The purpose of our research is to arrive at qualitative, rather than quantitative, 
robust results, and therefore the specification of parameters in our model 
(see Table 1) are not based on the results of empirical investigations or calibrations.  
 
Table 1 Specification of Parameters in the Model 
 
11 , 0 0  π   8 , 0 0  Y   1 , 1  Y   1
*  Y   23 0  E   24 0  ε  
08 , 0 0  s   2 , 0 0  z  
3 , 0
___
 Ex  
2 , 0 0  CF   7 , 0 0  M   3 , 0 0  E M  
2 , 1 0  P   6 , 0  a   8 , 0  b   7 , 0  c   25 , 1  α   5 , 1  β  
5 , 0  δ   13 , 0  t   75 , 0  xF α   5 , 1  YF α   1  eM α   75 , 0  YM α  
1  eS α   5 , 0  YS α   1  V   2 0  V   8 , 0  k   0  x  
   
Source: Data and calculations by the author. 
 
The value of the natural rate of output 
* Y  is equal to 1. The optimal value of 
output is given to be higher than its natural level. This approach is traditional in the 
macroeconomic literature. See, for example, Finn  E.  Kydland and Ed-
ward C. Prescott (1977). The set of predetermined variables (the stabilization fund  
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0 s , the international reserves  0 z , the money in circulation  0 E M , the capital flow 
0 CF , the autonomous export 
___
Ex ) are specified from considerations of scale and 
have been kept at a certain level for convenience. Fundamentally, however, the 
change of each parameter does not affect the qualitative results of the model. The 
same consideration applies to the model parameters such as  k ,  , as well as the ve-
locity of money ( 0 V ), real ( 0 ε ) and nominal ( 0 E ) exchange rates, and the tax rate t. 
Any variation in the price level ( 0 P ) also does not affect the qualitative implications 
from the model. To obtain qualitative results a wide range of parameters that charac-
terize the macroeconomic priorities of the agents ( YS eS YM eM YF xF α α α α α α , , , , , ) was 
considered. In numerical examples the deficit (surplus) was chosen at a level not ex-
ceeding 10% of output, which seems to be quite realistic assumption. It is also worth 
mentioning that parameter a  ranged from 0.3 to 0.9, parameters  c b,  varied from 0.1 
to 1, and parameters  β α,  ranged from 0.01 to 10. The most interesting and meaning-
ful results of variation of parameters are presented below. Calculations prove that all 
the results are robust. 
 
2. Strategic Interaction 
 
The way in which monetary policy affects the economy depends on the fiscal policy 
pursued by the government. Clearly, in this case the concrete mechanism of how the 
government and the central bank interact plays an important role. Below we will 
model various forms of the strategic interaction of these agents, after first consider-
ing their own loss functions. 
 
2.1 Loss Functions 
 
Social loss, along with the losses of the government and the central bank, are the 
main criteria for the efficiency of the macroeconomic policy being conducted. Below 
we consider the loss functions for the government, central bank and society, which 
are necessary for the further analysis of the interaction between fiscal and monetary 
policies. These loss functions are not standard and that is why we should appropri-
ately and in detail describe them. In fact, the loss functions are not micro-founded in 
the model, but we believe they properly describe the preferences of the main macro-
economic agents in a stylized model of a resource-based economy with undeveloped 
financial markets. 
 
The loss function for the government: 
 
   
2
1
2 2
1 2
1
Y Y α x x α π L YF xF F        (8)
 
Here 
2
1 π  is the square of the deviation of inflation from its optimal rate. For 
simplicity, but without lack of generality, the optimal rate of inflation can be taken to  
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be equal to zero. The expression  
2 x x  shows the square of the deviation of the 
discretionary budget surplus from the government’s optimal value of  x , which is 
determined by both economic and political considerations (such as the necessity of 
keeping government spending at a certain level). The discretionary budget surplus in 
the model differs from the overall budget surplus by the taxes that depend on export 
and output. We do not include taxes that depend on output in the government loss 
function to avoid double-counting because the deviation of output from its optimal 
level is already included in the loss function. The idea that government cares about 
the overall budget could be true for the developed countries, but it does not seem 
realistic for the resource-based economies with undeveloped financial markets, 
where the government tries to avoid political consequences (loss of popularity) re-
lated to export revenue fluctuations. For example, the government is reluctant to cut 
social payments following a decrease in export revenues. In sum, including taxes that 
depend on export into the loss function would be an unrealistic and inappropriate 
assumption for the resource-based economy. Therefore it is more reasonable to use 
the deviation of the discretionary budget, which includes lump-sum taxes and social 
payments, but not the deviation of the overall budget in the government loss func-
tion. In numerical examples, we took the optimal value to be  0  x . The expression 

2
1 Y Y   is the square of the deviation of output from its optimal level. Finally, the 
weight coefficients  xF α  and  YF α  characterize the priorities of the government in 
forming the discretionary budget surplus and output, respectively. The weight coeffi-
cient for inflation is taken to be equal to one.  
Thus, the government adheres to a fiscal policy that is a compromise between 
output and inflation and the government also has its own political and economic 
goals.  
 
The loss function for the central bank: 
 
  
2
1
2
1
2
1 2
1
Y Y α e α π L YM eM M       (9)
 
The loss function for the central bank has the same general form as the gov-
ernment. For simplicity, we assume that the optimal levels of output and inflation are 
the same for both agents. The specific target variable of monetary policy is the ex-
change rate. Here 
2
1 e  is the square of the deviation of the rate of growth of the nomi-
nal exchange rate from its optimal value. The fact that zero depreciation (apprecia-
tion) of the nominal exchange rate is optimal given a zero level of inflation is deter-
mined by purchasing power parity. 
In our model the increase in the real exchange rate has assured that the stabili-
zation fund will grow. Thus, aside from the standard output-inflation trade-off, the 
central bank must also manage the exchange rate of foreign currency. By conducting 
operations on the money market, the central bank can control the rate of growth of 
the nominal exchange rate. Here it needs to solve the problem of choosing between  
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stabilization of the rate of inflation or an exchange-rate policy that keeps export 
revenue high. Appreciation of foreign currency stimulates exports, in turn bringing 
about increases in output and budget revenues from export taxes (therefore allowing 
the stabilization fund to grow). However, buying foreign currency in order to main-
tain its high exchange rate implies an increase in the money supply and therefore an 
increase in the rate of inflation. The weights  eM   and  YM   characterize the priori-
ties of the central bank in determining the nominal exchange rate and the expansion-
ary output, respectively. As for the loss function for the government, the weight coef-
ficient for the rate of inflation is normalized to unity.  
 
The social loss function: 
 
  
2
1
2
1
2
1 2
1
Y Y α e α π L YS eS S       (10)
 
The form of the social loss function is the same as that of the central bank (ex-
cept for the weight coefficients). The inclusion of  1 e  in the social loss function is 
reasoned by the fact that in emerging market economies (such as Russia) a signifi-
cant part of households’ wealth is in the form of foreign currency. Therefore, for the 
private sector it is optimal to keep  1 π  and  1 e  at zero, in other words, to avoid any 
shocks. However, for a zero value of inflation the society would prefer an increase in 
1 e , which determines the profitability of savings in foreign currency. On the other 
hand, an increase in the nominal exchange rate brings about an increase in the price 
of imported goods. We assume, given the two opposite effects, that  0 1  e . The 
weight coefficients  eS α  and  YS α  characterize the priorities of society with respect to 
changes in the nominal exchange rate and to increases in aggregate income, respec-
tively. As in the loss functions considered above, the weight for the rate of inflation 
is taken to be equal to one.  
It is worth mentioning that we do not assume equal weights in the loss func-
tions of the central bank and the government. It would be analytically inappropriate 
to compare the weight coefficients of different macroeconomic agents between each 
other because of complete differences in the form of their loss functions. It seems to 
be more accurate to compare the weight coefficients of each agent separately. In the 
end, our aim is not to find out which agent’s preference over inflation or output is 
higher, but to clarify what macroeconomic variable is more significant for every 
agent. 
Unsurprisingly, benevolent government and central bank (the loss function of 
society, the government and central bank are the same) are most preferred in terms of 
design of fiscal and monetary policy and conducting the optimal macroeconomic 
policy. In this case, the problem of the optimal design of fiscal and monetary policy 
becomes trivial, so we do not consider the situation of benevolent fiscal and mone-
tary policy in this paper. Thus, for our analysis it is essential that the loss functions of 
society, the government and central bank are different. 
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Below we will consider various types of this interaction, compare the results 
and draw conclusions about their relative efficiency. 
 
2.2 Coordination 
 
We consider this possibility, since often the independence of the government and 
central bank is nominal, and in reality the actions of these two agents are coordinated 
by some third party (for instance, by the president). In this regard, it is important to 
understand if this type of interaction is effective in our models and if so, under what 
conditions.  
In the case of coordinated macroeconomic policy there is an additional pa-
rameter,  , the bargaining power of the agents. In our model this parameter will 
characterize the weights with which the loss functions of the fiscal and monetary au-
thorities will be included in the total loss function. The bargaining power of the cen-
tral bank is taken to be equal to one and   characterizes the relative bargaining 
power of the government.  
Thus, the general loss function in the case of coordination should be the loss 
function for a single agent and can be written as: 
 
    
2 2
1
2
1
2
1 1
2
1
x x ωα e α Y Y ωα α π ω L XF eM YF YM M F            (11)
 
The optimal values of the control variables of the government and the central 
bank,  x and  1 e , can be found by optimizing the loss function of the coordinated 
agents. We determine the equilibrium values of the variables  1 z ,  1 μ ,  1 π ,  1 E M ,  1 ε , 
1 Y  and  1 s  for these optimal values. Numerical examples are used in order to analyze 
these results. 
One of the main questions in the case of coordination between the fiscal and 
monetary policies is what the relative bargaining power of the government and cen-
tral bank should be in order to achieve the best outcome. In essence, this is a question 
about how the third, coordinating agent should assign weights to fiscal and monetary 
goals. In other words, this is a problem of designing the optimal institutions of gov-
ernment.  
In order to determine the optimal value of bargaining power, we compared the 
endogenous variables of the model as well as social loss and the coordinated policies 
for various values of ω. We are mostly interested in comparing the losses of coordi-
nated policy and of society for various values of the parameter ω. As the bargaining 
power of the government increases, we observe a significant increase in the losses of 
the coordinated policy and especially of society (see Figure 1). Thus, the coordinated 
interaction of fiscal and monetary authorities is efficient only if the central bank has 
high bargaining power. 
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Source: Data and calculations by the author. 
 
Figure 1  The Losses of the Coordinated Policy and of Society for Various Values of Bargaining 
Power Parameter 
 
 
Despite the critical significance of monetary policy in the case of coordina-
tion, the weights in the central bank’s loss function do not have a decisive impact. 
This has to do for the main part with the fact that, given the central bank’s high bar-
gaining power, the equilibrium values of the endogenous variables are close to their 
optimal values. This also explains why changes in the weights in social loss function 
also do not lead to noticeable changes in social loss. We note, however, that the 
closer the weights of the policies (and especially of the central bank) to those of soci-
ety, the smaller social loss will be. In other words, the most efficient interaction of 
the government and the central bank in the case of coordination is when the monetary 
authority is benevolent (when the loss functions of the central bank and of society 
coincide). 
We also note that the smaller the value of  , the higher the discretionary 
budget deficit (–x). However, given high revenues from export taxes and stable 
growth of output, this does not bring about a general budget deficit for the govern-
ment,  tY ε c Ex δ x  




   
___
. 
Actually, these results do not allow one to claim that the coordination of fiscal 
and monetary policies is always preferable. If the government and the central bank 
have opposing goals, adhere to different economic theories or make contradicting 
predictions about the country’s future economic development, then coordination of 
policies may be inefficient from both a political and an economic viewpoint. 
 
2.3 Stackelberg Interaction with the Government Leadership  
 
We will now consider Stackelberg interaction. The most characteristic case is one in 
which the central bank is independent of the government, yet the latter, being the 
leader, affects the central bank’s decision in order to achieve its goals. In determining 
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the optimal policy, the leader considers the possible reaction of the follower to its 
decisions.  
In our investigation, we will consider Stackelberg interaction only with the 
government in the role of leader. The case in which the central bank plays the role of 
leader will remain outside this paper. For the main part, this is based on the conclu-
sions of Dixit and Lambertini (2003) that leadership in fiscal policy is usually more 
efficient than leadership in monetary policy. 
The equilibrium values of  1 z ,  1 μ ,  1 π ,  1 E M ,  1 ε ,  1 Y  and  1 s  are determined af-
ter solving the optimization problems for the government and the central bank, given 
their Stackelberg interaction. We will use numerical examples for the analysis of our 
results. 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data and calculations by the author. 
 
Figure 2  The Losses of Society, the Government and the Central Bank Given a High Priority for 
Stabilizing Output 
 
It can be seen from Figure 2 that the social loss as well as losses of fiscal and 
monetary agents are high for low, negative values of x  that characterize the degree 
of fiscal expansion. This can be explained mostly by the excessively high level of 
output, which is more than its natural level, and by the high rate of inflation. It turns 
out that in a situation in which the government (the leader) adheres to an excessively 
contractionary fiscal policy with a large negative value of x , the central bank (the 
follower) chooses a loose policy. The significant increase in the money in circulation 
“overheats” the economy and social welfare decreases.  
However, in the case of the largest of the three equilibrium values of x , the 
losses of all macroeconomic agents are relatively high. This can be explained first of 
all by the extremely low level of output. In this case the low output is not compen-
sated by low inflation. The choice of the leader to adhere to a relatively expansionary 
fiscal policy - that is, the choice of the largest (negative but close to zero) equilibrium 
value of x  - forces the follower to adhere to a rather tight monetary policy and this 
brings about low output and low inflation. 
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Our analysis shows that the optimal value of x  corresponds to the level of 
output that is closest to its natural level, rather than to the target level. The choice of 
optimal strategy also does not depend crucially on either the sensitivity of the central 
bank to changes in the nominal exchange rate  eM α , or the sensitivity of the govern-
ment to the formation of the discretionary budget surplus  xF α .  
If both agents give a relatively low priority to the stabilization of output as the 
level of fiscal expansion increases, output will exceed its natural level to an even 
greater degree, and a contractionary fiscal policy will make output too low. Thus, the 
economy will either be overheated or in a deep recession and this will bring about a 
significant increase in social loss for low values of  YF α  and  YM α . The only winner is 
the government, whose leadership allows it to systematically minimize its loss even 
if it is pursuing policies that are inefficient for society. 
For high values of  YF α  and  YM α  and Stackelberg interaction of policies, the 
best outcome for society is achieved if the central bank is benevolent. 
 
3. Conclusion  
 
The analysis of equilibrium in the macroeconomic model of an export-oriented econ-
omy shows that, from the point of view of society, the most preferable situation is 
that in which the government and the central bank choose reasonably expansionary 
policies. In fact the increase in output, decrease in inflation and accumulation of the 
stabilization fund depend on what policies are pursued by the government and the 
central bank. 
In an export-oriented economy, the independence of the central bank does not 
play a significant role. The effective interaction of fiscal and monetary policies is 
possible under a cooperative Stackelberg game interaction with the government as 
leader. Social loss is minimal under both forms of interaction, if fiscal and monetary 
policies are expansionary and allow output to approach its optimal level. 
In other words, the efficient interaction of fiscal and monetary policies is pos-
sible given either coordination or political differences of opinion between the gov-
ernment and the central bank. Intuitively, this can be explained by the fact that the 
condition of independence of the central bank does not play a decisive role and is 
more a political rather than economic issue in a resource-based economy with unde-
veloped financial markets.  
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